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Christian Jochim 
CONFUCIUS AND CAPITALISM: 
VIEWS OF CONFUCIANISM IN WORKS ON 
CONFUCIANISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
In "the Myth of Confucian China," Laurence Thompson surveyed the development 
and nature of a certain bias in Chinese studies down into the 1970s: the tendency to 
consider all of Chinese culture "Confucian" (Thompson 1974). He indicated that this bias 
had its roots in attitudes formed among Chinese intellectuals during recent centuries, and 
that it had influenced Chinese studies for decades. In his own work on the religious 
dimension of Chinese culture, including the text Chinese Religion: An Introduction 
(Thompson 1988), he set out to correct this bias by striving to present Buddhist, Taoist, and 
"folk" traditions in China, alongside the Confucian tradition, as distinct traditions each worthy 
of scholarly attention and respect. Others working in this area during recent decades have 
also strived to use interpretive categories, especially "Confucianism" and "Taoism," very 
carefully. Thus, in most current work in Chinese Religious Studies, the myth of Confucian 
China seems to be nought but an error of the almost forgotten past. 
In many recent works on Confucianism and economic development, this is not the 
case. Therein we find an ironic replay of the work of Chinese reformers and Western 
sinologists of the past who, falling prey to the myth of Confucian China, used the label 
"Confucianism" to identify a wide range of elements of Chinese culture that they felt 
obstructed modern development. Now that theorists are seeking to explain developmental 
success rather than failure, many identify as "Confucian" cultural elements that purportedly 
enhance development in Chinese societies-Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan-that are 
experiencing economic growth. Moreover, some theorists go as far as to expand their scope 
of interest to include Korea and Japan, defined as "Sinic," and to identify as "Confucian" all 
cultural elements that are somehow basic to "Sinic" civilization. 
Apart from wanting to identify views of Confucianism in the social scientific works 
in question, there are at least two other motives for studying them. First, the phenomenon 
they seek to explain-the success of East Asian efforts to develop industrial capitalism-is one 
that merits explanation and has attracted global scholarly attention. Just as Weber felt 
called to explain the first origins of modern capitalism in Europe, others are now naturally 
1
 Research for this article has been carried with support from the Pacific 
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Taiwan, of whom two deserve special thanks: Chang Wei-an (Zhang Weian 3 ^ $$rfc~ )> 
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attracted by the first major case of its development outside the West in a way that challenges 
the West's global economic hegemony. Second, the works we will study also constitute an 
important new phenomenon. The social scientists who have written them are the first large 
group of post-May Fourth Chinese intellectuals who, largely sharing a scientistic Westernized 
background, have come to the defense of the Confucian tradition. For some, these two 
phenomena are directly related. In other words, now that hard facts have verified 
Confucianism's potential to aid modernization, its erstwhile critics have naturally changed 
their minds. We believe the issue is more complex than this, as the following pages will 
show. 
Of the many works on Confucianism and economic development, this article will 
restrict itself to describing works by social scientists in Taiwan and Hong Kong.2 It will not 
attempt to criticize these works for the purpose of arriving at a better understanding of the 
role of religious ideals or moral values in East Asian economic activity. There is already 
sufficient criticism of theorists who link "Confucianism" and economic activity by other 
scholars within the Chinese debate over Confucianism and economic development (see 
Jochim 1992). The purpose of this article is to understand certain social scientific works as 
contributions to contemporary Confucianism as a normative moral-spiritual tradition, despite 
the fact that they have been written as descriptive social science. In other words, this is an 
article treating the modernization of the Confucian tradition, not one treating the role of 
Confucianism in economic development. 
Peter Duus, acting as a discussant during the Conference on Confucianism and 
Economic Development in East Asia (Taipei, May 1989), made the following statement 
regarding the fact that there should be such a conference: "What this says to me is that the 
intellectual milieu in which this conference takes place is part of a continuing history of the 
revision and reinterpretation of Confucianism" (Chung-Hua Institution 1989: 57). This 
intellectual milieu is assumed to be the context for our analysis of recent works on 
Confucianism and economic development, including papers presented at the conference just 
mentioned. In our analysis, we also aim to adhere to the advice of Winston Davis, who has 
for some time criticized what he calls "Japan theory," social scientific explanations of the 
cultural factors in Japanese modernization which, despite their aim simply to describe 
Japanese values and behaviour, tend to have the normative effect of telling Japanese how 
they should behave. His advice is found in a passage suggesting a revision of current 
"Weberian" approaches to East Asian development as follows: 
Weber and Weberians have generally approached the problem of religion and 
development by analyzing the religion and values established before the onset 
Because much of the research for this paper was done in Taiwan, it reflects 
a clearer understanding of recent intellectual developments in Taiwan than of those in Hong 
Kong. 
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of industrialization, and by postulating a correlation (or 'elective affinity') 
between them and subsequent historical events.... I would suggest that more 
attention be paid to the religious attitudes that appear while development is 
taking place.... I think we should return to Weber's own interest in the 
(internal) transformation of the religions that are (externally) affecting 
development (Davis 1987: 269-70). 
Here we contend that an important dimension of what has appeared during the course of 
development in Taiwan, at least, are new attitudes about what "Confucianism" is and how 
people under its influence should behave. We also contend that among interpretations of 
the Confucian tradition that express and shape such attitudes are ones found in social 
scientific works discussing Confucianism and economic development. 
In the first section of the article, we will attempt to demonstrate how widespread and 
visible work on Confucianism and economic development has been for the last decade in 
Taiwan. In the second, we plan to describe the content of views of "Confucianism" as 
discussed in selected works. In the third section, we will comment on the possible effects 
of these views on the Confucian tradition itself, especially as it has evolved in recent 
decades. 
1 
The Debate over Confucianism and Economic Development 
Successful development in East Asia, especially in places under the influence of 
Chinese culture, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, surprised many observers. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, development experts were pessimistic about the economic 
future of these areas; sociologists, under Weber's influence, expected development to occur 
only with the import of Western "Protestant" values and the removal of "traditional" cultural 
obstructions to development; and sinologists continued to discuss Confucianism as a factor 
in China's failure to change and modernize in recent centuries. 
By 1980, however, Western scholars had begun to re-evaluate some of their positions, 
some even began to praise East Asian societies for their "superiority" or, at least, 
"comparative advantage" over the West in Economic matters. Works such as Japan as 
Number One (Vogel 1979) and The Eastasia Edge (Hofheinz and Calder 1982) became 
popular in the U.S. as well as in East Asia, having been translated into Chinese (Vogel, 
trans. Wu Yiren, 1980; and Hofheinz and Calder, trans. Chen Weiping, 1983). This was also 
the time of the formation of the "post-Confucian hypothesis." The futurologist Herman 
Kahn first made a direct connection between the traditional values of so-called "neo-
Confucian" societies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) and 
economic success (Kahn 1979: 121-123). Roderick Macfarquhar shortly afterward called 
attention to the "post-Confucian challenge" to the West of East Asian economies 
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(Macfarquhar 1980). As the term "Neo-Confucian" already had a standard use in the history 
of Chinese thought, the term "post-Confucian" came to be used in connection with the 
hypothesis that certain Chinese cultural values rooted in the Confucian tradition have a 
positive effect on economic development in societies where Confucianism no longer exists 
as a political or religious institution. Slightly later, Peter Berger formulated his 'Vulgar 
Confucianism" concept, suggesting that certain values of Confucian origin are now diffused 
throughout East Asian societies, aiding economic development (Berger 1983; cf. Berger 
1988). 
Although Western scholars had linked the values of Confucian, or "post-Confucian," 
societies with economic development, Chinese scholars would take a more active role in 
presenting the facts of East Asian economic development as a direct challenge to Weber's 
views on the Confucian tradition. Weber's Religion of China, first translated into Chinese 
in 1989 (Weber, trans, Jian Hui-mei, 1989), almost thirty years later than Weber's Protestant 
Ethic (Weber, Trans. Zhang Hanyu, 1960) was for the most part ignored by Chinese scholars 
until the 1980s, when it became a lightning rod for Chinese scholars chaUenging views on 
Confucianism as obstructing economic development. The first such Chinese scholar to take 
Weber to task seems to have been the well known Hong Kong sociologist Ambrose King 
(Jin Yaoji)3 in his paper "Rujia lunli yu jingji fazhan: Weibo xueshuo di chongtan" 
(Confucian ethics and economic development: a re-examination of Max Weber's thesis) 
which was presented in March 1983 at the first Seminar on Modernization and Chinese 
Culture, Chinese University of Hong Kong (Jin 1985; also see Jin 1983). The same year Yu 
Tzong-shian (Yu Zongxian, economist at Academia Sinica, Taipei, and now President of 
Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research) published an article criticizing Weber and 
explaining the influence of Chinese culture on Taiwan's economic growth (Yu 1983). 
We can see how quickly the debate developed by looking at four issues of Zhongguo 
Luntan (China Tribune) that were published during 1982-1984, featuring topics related to 
modernization and traditional Chinese culture. The first one (October 10, 1982), featuring 
discussion of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and Chinese Modernization, had virtually 
nothing to say about economic development. The second (August 10, 1983), featuring 
discussion of Chinese Style Management, began to address the role of traditional cultural 
values in economic development, but without any mention of Weber and Confucian ethics. 
The third (January 10, 1984), featuring an Overview of the Economies of Asia's Four 
Dragons, included essays directly responding to Weber (e.g., Hou 1984). And the fourth 
(December 25, 1984), featuring discussion of An East Asian Development Model: Cultural 
To indicate the name of the author of a Chinese work, we will use an author's 
own name for himself or herself in English, when it is known to us, followed by a standard 
Pinyin Romanization. Otherwise, we will use Pinyin Romanization only. In parenthetical 
citations, we will always use Pinyin so that these citations will match names as given in the 
list of Chinese References at the end of the article, which are in Pinyin. 
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Factors in Taiwan's Post-War Experience, was based on a September 4, 1984, forum in 
Taipei chaired by Peter Berger that began by addressing the topic: "Reinterpreting Weber's 
Thesis." 
The debate's further development can be seen by looking at the two other journals 
most frequently read by intellectuals in Taiwan: Zhishi fenzi ψ? VS^ y\'n 3r (The 
Intellectual) and Dangdai % fa (Con-Temporaiy). Several articles on Confucianism and 
economic development appeared in Zhishi Fenzi from 1985 to 1987 (Yu 1985, Sun 1986, 
Xiao 1986, Yang 1986, and Bao 1987). In 1987 and 1988, Dangdai ran articles responding 
to some of the work that had appeared previously in Zhishi fenzi and elsewhere (Chen 
1987a, Chen 1987b, and Hang 1988). In addition, several books on the topic became widely 
known among Taiwan's educated public (Yu 1987, Huang 1988, Gao 1988, and Zhang 1989). 
Of these, two will be the focus of special attention in section two of this essay: Hwang 
Kwang-kuo (Huang Guangguo)), Ruijia sixiangyu dongya xiandailiua (Confucian thought and 
East Asian modernization) and Zhang Desheng, Ruijia lunli yu zhixu qingjie: Zhongguo 
sbáang di shehuixue quanshi (Confucian ethics and the order complex: a sociological 
interpretation of Chinese thought). Compilations of articles, largely by Chinese authors, 
have also appeared in Chinese (e.g., Yang and Du 1987) and English (Berger and Hsiao 
1988 and Tai 1989). Late in the decade, the Taiwan Provincial Government ordered a study 
of religious beliefs and economic development (Qu and Zhang 1989); and a major 
international conference was held in Taipei (Conference on Confucianism and Economic 
Development in East Asia, May 29-31, 1989), the papers from which were later published 
(Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research 1989). 
The preceding discussion has been solely for the purpose of familiarizing the reader 
with some basic details regarding the discussion of Confucianism and economic development. 
In section three of this essay, we will offer our comments on the significance of this 
discussion, especially insofar as it has affected the internal development of the modern 
Confucian tradition. Prior to this, in section two, we aim to cover views of "Confucianism" 
in selected social scientific works produced during the course of the discussion. 
2 
Views of Confucianism 
The views of all the theorists to be discussed here bear a relation to the "post-
Confucian hypothesis," broadly defined. In other words, they all assume that "Confucianism" 
has elements which, in the appropriate modern environment, will encourage economic 
development, although these elements may not have done so in premodern China because 
of its different institutional (social,economic, political) environment. Also, while theorists 
look for continuity between modern and premodern China, they acknowledge that post-
Confucian culture is not the direct offspring of either the philosophy of the traditional 
Confucian elite or the imperial state ideology. Thus conceived,the post-Confucian hypothesis 
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has three forms that will be discussed here: (1) the post-Confucian hypothesis as such, the 
standard examples of which are found in Western works, with Chinese authors revising it and 
seeking to verify it empirically; (2) the "vulgar Confucianism" concept, coined by Peter 
Berger and influential among Chinese social scientists in recent years; and (3) the idea of 
a redirected sense of achievement motivation which, once linked to traditional moral or 
career goals, now drives economic development. 
The Post-Confucian Hypothesis 
Despite his use (or misuse) of the term "neo-Confucian" to describe economically 
successful East Asian societies, Herman Kahn is generally considered the originator of the 
"post-Confucian hypothesis." He listed two sets of factors that he believed to be 
instrumental in East Asian economic success: "[first] the creation of dedicated, motivated, 
responsible, and educated individuals and [second] the enhanced sense of commitment, 
organizational identity, and loyalty to various institutions" (Kahn 1979: 122). At almost the 
same time, Roderick Macfarquhar created a list of factors that overlaps with Kahn's namely: 
self-confidence, social cohesion, subordination of the individual, education for action, 
bureaucratic tradition, and moral certitude (MacFarquhar 1980: 71). As the reader has 
perhaps surmised,these lists were created with primary awareness of the Japanese case and, 
moreover, present relatively broad value orientations whose links to the Confucian tradition 
are rather tenuous. This has had several results: Chinese authors have treated these efforts 
to list cultural factors with caution; they have tried to ground these or similar lists of cultural 
factors in historical Confucianism, and they have sought empirical verification of the 
contemporary influence of such factors. 
Without necessarily using the term "post-Confucian culture", many Chinese authors 
share certain assumptions and a certain kind of response to Weber's work. They assume 
that Japan and the "four dragons" (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) have 
a common cultural background, which is lacking in other parts of the developing world 
(Africa, Latin America, etc.) and has been suppressed in communist East Asian nations 
(Vietnam and PRC). They refer to this cultural background as "Confucian." With reference 
to Weber, they approve of his effort to include so-called "cultural factors, " along with 
"institutional factors," in explaining social and economic developments. However, they find 
fault with Weber's understanding of Confucianism historically and, more importantly, argue 
that Weber was unable to see how Confucian culture would influence people's behaviour 
once it was separated from the political and religious institutions of imperial China. 
To give our first example, we find most of the theoretical assumptions just described 
in the aforementioned work of Ambrose King, although he is very cautious in presenting 
them and uses the terms "post-Confucian" and 'Vulgar Confucianism" only in connection with 
their creators, whom he identifies as Kahn and Berger, respectively (Jin 1985: 139 and 141). 
Nonetheless, King is typical in arguing that recent economic growth in East Asia is empirical 
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evidence that challenges Weber's judgment of Confucianism. He states: "Our view is 
definite: Weber's judgement indeed has just received a major challenge of empirical 
phenomena" (Jin 1985: 134). 
The relevant phenomena can be explained by reference to two kinds of factors: 
structural (or institutional) and cultural. The relevant cultural factors are identified as 
"Confucian ethics," but King says little about their content, except in describing the 
contributions of others, such as Kahn, whose contribution we have described above, and 
Berger, whose contribution will be described below. In any case, the reason for challenging 
Weber is that, although he was aware of the relevant elements of Confucian ethics, he did 
not foresee their role in societies free of the institutions with which Confucianism was linked 
in the past. 
Turning from sociology to economics, we find rather different explanations of the 
Confucian potential to aid economic growth that has been released during the recent East 
Asian "economic miracle." The case of Hou Chia-chu (Hou Jiaju \f^i¡< &q} , Director 
of the Institute of Research Economics, Soochow University) is especially interesting 
because, in his view, he had already proposed something like the post-Confucian hypothesis 
two decades earlier than Kahn. In an article in one of the aforementioned issues of 
Zhonggua luntan, he reviews the position he held already in 1960 (Hou 1984; also appended 
to his book on Confucian economic thought, Hou 1985: 401-407; in English, see Hou 1989). 
He had listed the key features of traditional Chinese culture that encourage economic 
development, "all of which were advocated by Confucianism." They are diligence and thrift, 
tendency to save, respect for work, honesty, and harmony (Hou 1984: 35). In the same 
place, he also acknowledges that traditional Chinese culture had economically-dysfunctional 
elements (most of which were advocated by Taoism!): restraining desires, following fate, 
lacking courage, and being conservative and complacent. Hou's main purpose, however, is 
not simply to list modern remnants of traditional Confucian ethics. It is to demonstrate that 
there was, already by the late Zhou period, Confucian economic thought that continues to 
have value today. This was "liberal" economic thought, stressing free competition, self-
interest, private property, and specific economic planning strategies. In this article, and in 
greater detail in his book, Xianqin rujia ziyou jingji sixiang (Pre-Qin Confucian liberal 
economic thought; Hou 1985), he seeks proof of this in classical Confucian texts. Of course, 
in the context of the post-Confucian hypothesis, we must ask: Why did this thought have 
so little effect until recently? Hou answers with a three part explanation (Hou 1985: 394). 
First, telling us to understand that economic growth is a relative matter, he points out that 
there was substantial economic activity in traditional China. Second, he explains that values 
from sources other than Confucianism, such as Taoism, had a negative influence. Third, and 
most important, from Han times onward, the centralized imperial state thwarted free 
economic activity at every turn. Thus, only after the demise of imperial China was it 
possible for the potential of the Confucian tradition to realize itself in the realms of both 
private ethics (popular Confucian values) and public policy. 
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In another example from economics, the aforementioned article by Yu Tzong-shian 
explains that, in terms of modern views on "production relationships" (shengchan guanti), 
traditional China had a basically sound system that was spoiled by certain misunderstandings 
and shortcomings. It is therefore a good example of a theory that sees traditional culture 
as having a potential which has been released in the twentieth century by the challenge and 
contribution of the West. Finding traditional potential involves considerable reinterpretation 
of classical Confucian texts. For example, according to Yu, passages in Lwnyw(Analects) and 
Mengzi (Master Meng) that contrast "profit" (//) and "rightness" (yi) should not be interpreted 
as meaning that Masters Kong and Meng were against profit. They were only against profit 
obtained by immoral means. "However, Yu concludes, people's misunderstanding of Kong-
Meng thought, increasingly viewing them as emphasizing 'benevolence' (ren) and 'rightness' 
and neglecting 'utility', became a source of chronic weakness in China. Not only were early 
Confucians open to moral "profit," or "self interest" (zffi), says Yu, their works yield evidence 
that ancient China had a concept of private property (Yu 1983: 4). 
The key problem in later times was the tendency of the educated class to think only 
of entering the gentry path and, hopefully, officialdom but not of entering technical or 
mercantile trades. There were also other shortcomings, such as the family's monopolization 
of "management" and the lack of a banking system. However, in the twentieth century, as 
a result of facing the challenge of the West and borrowing some of the West's institutional 
innovations, these shortcomings have disappeared and more successful production 
relationships have merged. Yu puts this as a simple formula: "China's traditional culture 
+ Western catalyst = economic growth" (Yu 1983: 9). 
A third economic theory that we wish to summarize here is also very optimistic in its 
assessment of the potential of traditional Chinese values. It is from a paper by John C. H. 
Fei (Fei Jinghan, Economics, Yale University) presented at the aforementioned Conference 
on Confucianism and Economic Development in East Asia (Fei 1989; also see Fei 1986, in 
Chinese). Traditional Chinese values, Fei says, "at the risk of over-simplification" can be 
called "Confucianism" (Fei 1989: 259). His aim is "to prove" the cultural affinity between 
Confucianism and the cultural values of the "modern growth epoch" (1780-1980) as defined 
by the internationally known economist Simon Kuznets. For Kuznets, these values, or 
"historical values inputs," were secularism, nationalism, and egalitarianism (Fei 1989: 270). 
Due to Confucianism's well known interest in human affairs and advocacy of a life 
characterized by ceaseless endeavour and moral discipline in the world, it easily qualifies as 
"secular" (Fei 1989: 274-75). As for its contribution to "nationalism," Fei states: "Under 
Confucianism, the nationalism of a 'country family' (guo-jia) is always a cultural phenomenon 
which is readily extended to be inclusive of all human beings" (Fei 1989: 275). Regarding 
egalitarianism, he explains: "the belief in 'individualism' (or, more correctly, individual 
family) in the Confucian tradition is deductible from the high value attached to human 
dignity guaranteed, not so much by 'birth right,' as by the equality of a potential that one is 
free to explore" (Fei 1989: 275-76). 
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In light of his analysis, Fei concedes, readers might ask why the modern growth epoch 
did not first occur in China. The missing ingredient, he explains, was science. Believing in 
a unity of the inner and outer world, traditional Confucians thought they could grasp the 
principles of the universe without outward, empirical investigation. This lack of a 
philosophical basis for a tradition of science and technology explains why the modern growth 
epoch first occurred outside China (Fei 1989: 277). Yet China's overall cultural value 
system, i.e., "Confucianism," was preadapted for modern industrial capitalism, once it arrived. 
Our final example of a work related to the post-Confucian hypothesis as such, from 
the discipline of psychology, is interesting for two reasons: (1) one of its authors, Yang 
Kuo-shu (Yang Guoshu, Psychology Department Chair, Taiwan National University) has 
been known as a leading behaviorist researching the shift away form traditional values in 
Taiwan4 and (2) the explicit purpose of the authors, Yang and Cheng Po-shyun (Zheng 
Bo-xun) is to offer empirical verification of the post-Confucian hypothesis. Their article is 
entitled "Chuantong jiazhiguan, geren xiandaixing ji zuzhi xingwei: hourujia jiashuo di yixiang 
weiguan yanzheng" (Confucianized values, individual modernity, and organizational behavior: 
an empirical test of the post-Confucian hypothesis [authors' English title]). In a brief English 
abstract, we find the main thrust of the article expressed, as follows: 
The present study provides an empirical evaluation of the Post-Confucian 
Hypothesis, as elaborated by G.S. Redding (1984), in which Post-Confucian 
values are said to be related to positive organizational behavior. To test this 
hypothesis, a new scale in the Chinese language was constructed to assess five 
clusters of Confucianized Chinese values, viz., Familism, 
Modesty/Contentment, Face Consciousness/Relationship Orientation, 
Solidarity/Harmony, and Hardship-overcoming/Hardworking. Scores on these 
clusters were related to various measures of organizational behavior for a 
sample of 462 employees chosen form nine business organizations in Taiwan. 
It is found that Confucianized values has [sic] a positive relationship with good 
organizational behavior....(Yang and Zheng 1987: 49).5 
4
 For example, see Yang, "Zhongguoren di tuibian" ^t fi A . *3 Ì A \ 
(Transformation of the Chinese; yang 1980), the content of which is used by one of the most 
vehement critics of the post-Confucian hypothesis, the Chinese mainland scholar Bao 
Zunxin, to argue that the values aiding Taiwan's development are essentially Western (Bao 
1988). In English, see Yang, "chínese Personality and Its Change" (Yang 1985). 
5
 The work referred to by Gordon Redding is a conference paper entitled 
"Operationalizing the Post-Confucian Hypothesis," which was subsequently published 
(Redding 1985). Also see Redding's more recent work, TJie Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 
(Redding 1989). 
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It is perhaps relevant that in the sample of 462 employees, most worked for large companies 
(65.4%), rather than the small to mid-sized enterprises that make up the great bulk of 
Taiwan's businesses; and all but 3 (0.6%) had gone beyond the compulsory nine years of 
education to high schools (21.6%), career colleges (33.3%), universities (37.2%), or graduate 
institutions (5%) (Yang and Zheng 1987: 9). More relevant for present purposes are the 
"Confucianized values" which these predominantly well educated corporate employees say 
they hold. The survey instrument contained 40 actual terms, which for purposes of analysis 
were grouped into the five clusters described. Each item is a four-character phrase stating, 
in aphoristic form, a well-known Chinese virtue (Yang and Zheng 1987:10). For example, 
in the Familism (jiatingjuyi %* %^ £. Jk, ) cluster are listed "loyalty to family" (zhong 
yujiating j& %> ^ ¿ ), "filial to parents?'(xiaosfiun fumu % "!& £.-*h ), "having 
a sense of justice" (you zhengyigan \ Í- J^ & ), "family members help one another" 
(jiaren huju % ^ ¿ %b ), "having constancy in working" (zuoshi yuheng y#Lf' If 
•fi ). "taking responsibility and exerting oneself' (fuze jinzhi & -^ Γ £ S0Q )> and so 
forth. To give a few more examples, in the Modesty/Contentment (qianrang shoufen 
i%L Ï|L § τ* ) cluster, the Way of the Mean (zhongyong zhi dao ^ % i, á L ) leads 
the list; in the Face Consciousness/Relationship Orientation (mianzi guanti 4P f- F $ 
'\% ) cluster, "keeping face" (baohu mianzi \% $)L <0 ir ) leads the list; in the 
Solidarity/Harmony (tuaniie hexie |f) j$ %* %% ) cluster, we have "harmony with others 
(yuren hexie J £ A* %* *% ) and "spirit of being together" (tuanjie jingshen |f) ¿$ 
%% #f ), among other phrases; and in the Hardship-overcoming/Hardworking (kenan keku 
iL ÍÉ £'i -£ ) c luster> Aese two are listed: Take risks and face difficulties" (maotian 
fannan % ?& 32, ^£ ) and "suffer hardships and withstand hard work" (chiku nailao 
It would be enlightening but impractical to give the authors' entire list of 40 items. 
The examples given should indicate clearly enough what the authors mean by "confucianized 
values," which interestingly are referred to in Chinese simply as "traditional value 
orientations" (chauntong jiazhiguan \1% & \% \% yfej ). Whether or not the authors are 
justified in connecting these values with good organizational behavior is an issue that does 
not concern us here. We are concerned primarily with two other issues. First, as with the 
economists discussed above, the authors use a rather utilitarian standard to evaluate 
Confucian values (i.e., whether or not they improve organizational behavior), and second, 
they list a wide range of traditional Chinese values which can be identified with the 
Confucian tradition only at the expense of making the tradition seem extremely broad and 
amorphous. As we turn to look at examples of the use of "vulgar Confucianism," we will find 
these same tendencies exhibited again. 
Vulgar Confucianism 
Peter Berger has been the foreign scholar who has most deeply influenced Chinese 
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scholars in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Conference papers containing his early formulations 
of the concept of 'Vulgar Confucianism" and of an 'East Asian development model" (a 
second case of modernization, in addition to the Western one) were published in Chinese 
(Berger 1984a, 1984b). Berger has attended several conferences in East Asia, and he 
continues to maintain contact with scholars in East Asia, especially through his Institute for 
the Study of Economic Culture (Boston University, founded 1985). As to 'Vulgar 
Confucianism," he acknowledges its links to the post-Confucian hypothesis, which he has 
described as follows: "the hypothesis is that a key variable in explaining the economic 
performance of these countries [Japan and the newly industrialized countries of East Asia] 
is Confucian ethics-or post-Confucian ethics, in the sense that the moral values in question 
are now relatively detached form the Confucian tradition proper and having become more 
widely diffused' (Berger 1988: 7).6 As to the nature of these values, he gives the following 
list: "a positive attitude to the affairs of the world, a sustained lifestyle of discipline and self-
cultivation, respect for authority, frugality, an overriding concern for stable family life" 
(Berger 1988: 7-8). 
Berger's influence has stemmed mainly form his international reputation and his 
coining the phrase "vulgar Confucianism." Chinese scholars do not necessarily seek to 
employ the specific values he lists. In fact, neither of the two scholars we are about to 
discuss would conceive of himself as a disciple of Berger in any sense. The sociologist Wong 
Siu-lun (Huang Shaolun -^ ¿J fâ , Hong Kong University), who has researched Hong 
Kong business practices extensively, in recent years has joined many others in seeking the 
cultural roots of Hong Kong's economic success. He edited Zhongguo zongjiao lunli yu 
xiandaihua yantaohui (Chinese religious ethics and modernization), the proceedings of the 
third Seminar on Modernization and Chinese Culture, Hong Kong, June 1988, in which a 
piece of his own is included (Huang 1991). Roughly the same piece had been previously 
published in English under the title "Modernization and Chinese Culture in Hong Kong" 
(Wong 1986). Although Wong does not use the term "Confucianism" in the title of his 
article, it is in his thesis statement, as follows: "If Confucianism is understood in a broad 
sense as a cultural ethos, then we may hypothesize that the Chineseness of Hong Kong is 
causally linked with its industrial performance" (Wong 1986: 307). As for the nature of this 
cultural ethos, he lists four major elements: "incorporative cosmology, high achievement 
motivation, familism, and utilitarian discipline" (Wong 1986: 308-309). He exemplifies the 
first of these, incorporative cosmology, mostly by reference to popular religious practice in 
Hong Kong. And he indicates its value by saying that "the inherent eclecticism of their 
cosmology should enable Chinese to become adept borrowers of foreign practices" (Wong 
Berger does not explain what he means by "the Confucian tradition proper," 
nor does he indicate the starting date of the phenomenon of wide diffusion of Confucian 
ethics that is "now" occurring, despite the fact that research on this diffusion over the past 
thousand years or so has already been done. 
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1986: 309). As for achievement motivation, it is exemplified by émigré Shanghai 
businessmen who came to Hong Kong, of whom he states: 'They treasured autonomy and 
disliked subjugation, an attitude which was probably rooted in the Chinese cultural ethos" 
(Wong 1986: 311). He later explains that such individual autonomy is actually encouraged 
by certain aspects of the Chinese family system, which differs from the Japanese one (Wong 
1986: 312). As for familism itself, especially in its relation to business, it can appear as 
"paternalistic managerial ideology and practice, nepotistic employment, or family ownership" 
(Wong 1986: 313). Finally, by utilitarian discipline, Wong means self control rooted in a 
pragmatic, problem solving attitude, including "a tendency among the Chinese to be keenly 
aware of cost and benefit calculations in both monetary and human investments" (Wong 
1986: 319). Despite the existence of this cultural ethos among Chinese, it has served the 
function of aiding economic performance only recently, according to Wong, for basically the 
same reason given by proponents of the post-Confucian hypothesis. New institutional 
arrangements, which are also described by Wong (Wong 1986: 319-3224), have now made 
it possible for this cultural ethos to realize its potential role in economic development. 
Turning to our second author, anthropologist Chen Qinan (Chinese University of 
Hong Kong), we find a very qualified use of "Confucian culture" in connection with economic 
behavior. In "Rujia wenhua yu chuantong shangren di zhiye lunli" (Confucian culture and 
the professional ethics of traditional merchants), he in fact argues that most scholars 
discussing Confucianism and economic development use "Confucian ethics" when they 
basically mean Chinese family ethics (Chen 1987a: 59; the article is continued in Chen 
1987b). Thus, Confucian culture as discussed by Chen is the family system and its values. 
According to Chen, this system and its values has changed little over the last one thousand 
years. In particular, it has continually encouraged its members to work for the glory of their 
ancestors. But the nature of the careers one could legitimately pursue to glorify ancestors 
evolved over time, as objective historical conditions changed. In recent centuries, especially 
in the case of overseas Chinese, mercantile careers became ever more acceptable, and the 
potential of Chinese to dignify their families through economic success was realized. The 
similarity of this approach to the post-Confucian hypothesis as discussed in the previous 
subsection should be obvious. As we will soon see, it also bears links to discussions of 
Confucianism and economic development that stress achievement motivation. 
Achievement Motivation 
As early as the 1960s, David McClelland discussed achievement motivation as a 
primary variable in the relatively greater economic success of Chinese among other groups 
in Southeast Asia (McClelland 1963), for example, and also presented the results of 
comparative reflections on achievement in a more global context (McClelland 1966). His 
work is well known to most of the Chinese social scientists covered in this essay. Basically, 
he and others believe that it is possible to measure the level of influence and "achievement 
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motive" has in the culture of a certain social group and to predict that, where its influence 
is strong, economic growth is more likely to occur. It is related to the post-Confucian 
hypothesis, especially in the works we will consider here, because the achievement motive 
in question is presented as belonging to traditional Confucianism but as not manifesting its 
potential in the economic sphere until Chinese found themselves in situations quite unlike 
the institutional context of traditional China. We will consider works by an historian, a 
psychologist, and a sociologist. 
Huang Chin-hsing (Huang Jinxing, Institute of History and Philology, Academia 
Sinica, Taipei), sees the historical situation of Confucianism as to a degree similar to that 
of Protestantism (Huang 1987). In particular, for Huang, it is the unintentional way in which 
Confucianism seems to have aided the capitalist enterprise that resembles the situation of 
Protestantism as described by Weber. Of course, the historical details are different: the 
possibility of a significant change in the way Confucian ethics influenced the lives of Chinese 
merged only in recent centuries, as they came to exist apart from the institutions of imperial 
China, first by migration to Southeast Asia and later by reform (1905) and revolution 
(11911) in China. In the lives of people for whom imperial examinations and an official 
career had become irrelevant, Confucian ethics began to play a more central role in the 
pursuit of another goal: economic success. Ostensibly, the goal of Confucian ethics had 
always been "to realize one's virtuous nature" (cheng de f& ^ ), so for ethics to be 
reoriented toward the pursuit of economic success was just as ironic as the supposed role 
of Protestant ethics-rooted in the hope for salvation-in the rise of Western capitalism. 
However, Huang warns us, a capitalistic reorientation of Confucian ethics—defined as 
stressing love of learning, discipline, and achievement motivation—is not enough to assure 
economic success. The needed socio-historical situation must also contain certain nonmoral 
factors: capital, managerial systems, technology, and so forth. Although Huang rejects the 
causal relationship between Confucianism and economic development that he sees in works 
defending the post-Confucian hypothesis, in stressing need for the kind of new institutional 
context stipulated by the post-Confucian hypothesis refers, Huang shares a basic assumption 
with others we have discussed. 
The final two works we will discuss have been saved for last for a special reason: 
each is an entire book that performs a social scientific hermeneutic of Confucian texts and 
history in the context of commenting on the issue of Confucianism and economic 
development. Moreover, each has attracted much attention in the world of Chinese social 
science and beyond. Thus, each serves as an especially interesting example of explicit and 
influential interpretation of the Confucian tradition by a social scientist. The books in 
question, already identified in section one above, are by Hwang Kwang-kuo and Zhang 
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Desheng.7 
Hwang Kwang-kuo (Psychology, National Taiwan University) is well known for his 
creative analysis of Chinese behavior using hybrid (Chinese-Western) models, rather than 
simply depending on Western Psychology to explain Chinese behavior. An example of this 
in English is his article Tace and Favor: The Chinese Power Game" (Hwang 1987). The 
work on which we now focus (Huang 1988) builds on his previous work in order to solve the 
"riddle of the century": Is Confucianism ultimately beneficial or detrimental to East Asian 
modernization? According to Hwang, this is a riddle the solution of which requires a 
systematic approach. First, one must answer the question: What is Confucianism? Second, 
one must analyze the influence of Confucianism's actual influence on individual behavior in 
daily life from the perspective of Behavioral science. Third, in interpreting Confucian texts 
one must avoid the traditional scholar's method of "using classics to interpret classics" (yijing 
jiejing wC i l fai $& ), and instead offer interpretations that reach down to the level of 
personal behavior. Finally, one must test one's interpretations by reference to empirical 
studies of Chinese behavior patterns today (Huang 1988: i-ii). 
Informed by this advice, Hwang's book has three sections. The first covers the fate 
of Confucianism at the hands of Chinese and Western scholars in recent decades and 
presents a chapter length introduction to Weber's views on Confucianism and Protestantism. 
The second section, the longest by far (over 200 pages) gives Hwang's interpretation of 
Confucianism or, to be specific, the "internal structure of Confucian thought" (rujia sitiang 
di neizaijiegou \% | c % % «5 <# & & #&- ). The third section is meant to 
demonstrate that Hwang's interpretation is compatible with empirical studies of 
Confucianism's influence on Chinese behavior today. 
Our first interest here is Hwang's model of Chinese behavior patterns which, 
developed over the years, play a major role in his recent interpretation of Confucian 
thought. We begin with the following facsimile of a chart from his book entitled "Model of 
the Confucian Mind" (Huang 1988: 87).8 
First of all, both works have sold well. According to the publisher, which is 
the same for both works, as of June 1992, Hwang's book had sold nearly all 5,000 copies of 
its first printing; and Zhang's had done even better, as it was in its third printing, with 3,000 
copies for each printing. Hwang's book has been the topic of at least three long review 
articles (Guan 1990, Zheng 1991, and Lin 1992); and Zheng's book received the 1990 
"golden vessel award" (jinding jiang φ* Λ 31 ) from the News and Information Section, 
Administrative Yuan, ROC government. 
8
 The English terminology in our version of Hwang's chart comes mostly from 
his English article, "Face and Favor" (Hwang 1987). 
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The chart represents the mental process (or mind as a whole, part of which is the 
conscience-like "mind of ren" that is so important for Confucians. The stage of the mental 
process in which consciousness of "ties" is important is represented by a diagonally divided 
rectangle to show that, as the petitioner changes from a stranger to a friend or relative (from 
top to bottom), the criterion of judgement becomes less instrumental and more affective in 
nature. The chart thus indicates how a person handles a request from someone else by 
taking into account the nature of the relationship between self and other as well as various 
rules of social exchange. 
In previous work, Hwang has used this model, without reference to Confucian 
terminology (e.g., ren, yi, li), to explain interpersonal behavior patterns in Chinese society. 
In doing so, he has given a central role to three justice norms which, in social exchange 
theory, have been considered universal, and he has explained how these norms need to be 
modified when used to explain Chinese behavior. In Tace and Favor," he summarized these 
norms and indicated the necessary modifications, especially in the case of the equality norm, 
as follows: 
The equity rule encourages individuals to allocate resources in proportion to 
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their contributions. It is primarily activated in economically oriented 
situations...or when individuals are in a 'unit' relationship, that is, when they 
perceive each other as role occupants rather than as individuals.... The 
equality norm dictates that profits or losses be distributed equally among 
members regardless of their objective contributions. It tends to predominate 
under conditions of cooperative social harmony.... the need norm of justice 
dictates that dividends, profits, or other benefits should be distributed to 
satisfy recipients' legitimate needs, regardless of their relative contributions. 
It will predominate...when individuals have a very close relationship...or when 
an individual has an 'identity relation' and empathetic involvement with other 
people.... While agreeing that these rules of behavior are near universals, I 
argue that they fall short of capturing the full richness of the behavioral 
quandaries faced by participants in some cultures.... An example is the 
Chinese category of renqing, which is the focus of this article. A variant of the 
universal equality rule, renqing is much more highly elaborated and more 
tightly bound up with ideas of reciprocity (bao [^5j) than it is in many other 
cultures (Hwang 1987: 945-46). 
As Hwang's chart indicates these exchange rules are used by Chinese individuals within a 
complex process that begins with "judging the guanti" one has with a "petitioner" and ends 
with psychological conflict that can only be resolved by deciding how to respond to a 
"petitioner." 
Such behavior patterns have long been the focus of Hwang's work. But only in his 
recent book on Confucianism and economic development has he put them in the context of 
a thorough hermeneutics of Confucian thought. He feels confident in doing so because 
Confucianism has, for over two thousand years, "ceaselessly shaped the thought and behavior 
of the Chinese and already become part of the deep psychological structure within the 
collective unconsciousness of the Chinese race" (Huang 1988:18). In fact, he feels confident 
that he only needs to interpret the documents of pre-Qin Confucianism (the thought of 
Masters Kong, Meng, and Xun) in order to find the roots of Chinese behavior patterns 
today. 
What Hwang lacks in historical scope he makes up for with his ability to systematize 
pre-Qin Confucian thought, which he realizes was not a unified philosophical system in its 
own time. His systematization of early Confucianism is found in chapters five through eight. 
Chapter five, "The Confucian Way: The Ethical System of Ren, Yi, and Li," explains that 
the three key moral concepts of the system were connected with the three key pre-Qin 
Confucian thinkers: Kong (ren), Meng (yi), and Sun (li). It also explains that part of the 
nature of each concept is an implicit stress on "differentiation" (chaxwdng % fy f ¿ )> 
which is important within an overall system of substantivist ethics. Based on "substantive" 
rather than 'formal"rationality (in Weberian terms), the system stresses personal relationships 
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and, moreover, assumes that ethical principles should be interpreted according to the specific 
nature of the social relationship between self and each different other. Having thus 
established the centrality of "differentiation," Hwang goes on in chapters six through eight 
to show that ren, yi, and li are related to the three rules of social exchange from his chart. 
The overall result is that in facing a "petitioner," a Chinese person will, first, make a ren-like 
judgment of guanti, second select and apply the right exchange rule according to yi, and, 
finally, on the basis of li decide on an appropriate response (grant a favor, repay a debt, 
offer a gift, etc.). 
In chapters nine and ten, Hwang discusses, respectively, the traditions of personal 
cultivation and social service in Confucianism, setting the stage for his focus on the 
achievement motive in part three of his book. This part consists of one chapter (eleven) on 
"The Transformative Power of Confucian Thought." This chapter's aim is to provide 
empirical verification of the role in Chinese behavior today, especially behavior significant 
for economic growth, of the Confucian values described earlier in the book. The first section 
of the chapter reviews the themes of Confucian cultivation: being dedicated to learning 
(haoxue -j$- $f£ ), exerting oneself (lixing ή \^ ), and knowing shame (zhichi %p J¡'& ). 
In the next section, attention is shifted to the achievement motive. The contents of chapters 
six through eight are summarized and the achievement motive is linked to Confucian ethics 
by reference to the themes of Confucian cultivation (Hwang 1988: 283-286). Then, in the 
third section, on the topic "taking up the Way to save the world" (yitao jishi v*A *JL ; W* 
•fi* ), data is given to show that the traditional Confucian motivation to serve and reform 
society lives on, especially among Taiwan students who return home after going abroad to 
study (Hwang 1988: 298-304).9 Finally, he offers this conclusion: 
Their motive for returning to serve their country is "to take up the Way to 
serve the world," to return home to reconstruct their mother society using 
knowledge learned abroad. In terms of Kant's concepts, what drove them to 
go to Western countries to study "theoretical reason" was "practical reason" 
originating in Confucian thought, which also led them to return home to 
contribute what they studied. In terms of Weber's concepts, the "substantive 
rationality" of the Confucian value orientation drove East Asian intellectuals 
to study as well as to spread at home the "formal rationality" that originated 
in Western culture (which constituted the foundation of industrial capitalism's 
development), thereby producing the modernization of East Asian countries 
(Hwang 1988: 304). 
Hwang's argument is rather weak at this point since it is based on the attitudes 
of students who return from abroad, completely ignoring the significance of the fact that the 
great majority of students who go abroad to study never return. This fact casts doubt on the 
depth of their motivation "to take up the Way to save the world." 
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Apart from the heavy use of jargon, from Kant and Weber, for example, there is little that 
differentiates Hwang's argument from other explanations of economic development which 
argue that an achievement motive rooted in traditional Confucianism can be redirected 
toward new goals. The other "Confucian values" for which Hwang offers empirical evidence 
are also rather standard fare: devotion to family, work ethic, love for education. In other 
words, it is hard to see how his operative definition of "Confucianism" (the one he uses in 
explaining its role in economic development) is affected by his long and complex social 
scientific hermeneutics of pre-Qin Confucian thought. In the end, he too gives us a version 
of the post-Confucian hypothesis: certain elements of traditional Chinese culture, to which 
the label "Confucian" is applied, are claimed to serve new and different functions in the 
modern institutional environment of certain East Asian societies. 
The "sociological interpretation of Chinese thought" in Zhang Desheng's book has a 
much narrower focus than Hwang's interpretation. Whereas Hwang concerns himself with 
the whole ethical system in pre-Qin Confucianism, Zhang focuses on only one aspect of 
thought during that period: the concern with social order. Zhang acknowledges that others 
have already analyzed the Chinese fear of disorder, naming Richard Solomon and Sun 
Longji ?j^ ?fc- %. . But he claims that there is a task which they have left for him to 
perform: to seek its origins over 2,000 years ago in the thought and history of the Spring 
and Autumn, Warring States period. Although other periods in Chinese history have also 
been chaotic, he explains this period constituted the formative period of Chinese culture, 
which was determinative for later times. Also, although Confucianism was not the only 
school of thought that responded to the chaos of this period, it is the most important one, 
having "controlled Chinese thought and behavior from that time on." Thus, pre-Qin 
Confucianism is the best place to look for the origins of a Chinese psychological complex 
due to which "one's face changes at any mention of disorder" (Zhang 1989: 11). 
Although Zhang's book claims to provide a sociological interpretation of Chinese 
thought, it contains much less actual coverage of Confucian texts than Hwang's work. Only 
in chapter three, "The Confucian Response [to disorder]," which follow two methodological 
chapters, do we find extensive interpretation of texts. Later chapters cover the response 
outside the Confucian school (ch. 4), Confucian thought and social control (ch. 5), Confucian 
ethics and the order complex (ch.6), Buddhist and Taoist ethics and the order complex (ch. 
7),and Confucian ethics and modern China (ch. 8). Since selection is interpretation, we must 
note what texts and passages Zhang interprets, especially in Chapter three. There and 
elsewhere he uses a very narrow range of passages from Lunyu, mostly ones on li (ritual) 
and xiao (filiality). The only other text frequently cited (especially in ch. 6) is Liji (Records 
of rituals). And the only extensive treatment of texts is in a section of chapter three on the 
normative features of Master Kong's doctrines. There each passage is interpreted according 
to the assumption that Kong's overriding passion for order can be seen in his concern with 
personal cultivation and social relations, next to which all other concerns become secondary. 
Zhang feels he can make his point especially clear in interpreting Lunyu 13:4, a 
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passage in which Master Kong castigates Fan Chi as a xiaoren ("small man") for being 
concerned about agriculture (Zhang 1989: 69). In Zhang's view, Master Kong responded 
as he did, not because he looked down on the laboring class, as some have suggested, but 
because he had his priorities wrong. Thus Master Kong said: "[When it comes to 
agriculture] I am not as good as an old farmer." And, after Fan Chi left, the Master said: 
,rWhat a small man is Fan Xu. If one devotes himself to the rites, the people will not dare 
to be irreverent; if one devotes himself to rightness, the people will not dare to be 
subversive, if one devotes himself to being trustworthy, the people will not dare to be 
insincere." Here, we are told,we have a perfect example of Kong's attitude that "if one 
grasps the key principle, all the details will fall into place." The key principle, of course, is 
social order. If that can be established, the Master believed, all other problems will be 
solved, it is for the same reason that Master Kong said: The junzi plans for the sake of the 
Way, not for the sake of eating.... The junzi worries about the Way, not about poverty" 
(Lunyu 15: 31). It is also why he said: fT)o not wony about [the people] being poor, worry 
about popular discontent" (Lunyu 16:1). Examples like this, Zhang concludes, are enough 
to prove wherein Master Kong's main focus really lies (Zhang 1989: 70). 
Zhang also finds the roots of the Chinese order complex in certain personal features 
of master Kong's life. For example, his failure to influence leaders in his time aggravated 
his fear of disorder; and his feelings for ritual were beyond rationality (Zhang 1989: 67). 
In concluding chapter three, Zhang explains that Kong, as a child of his time, deeply 
believed that social order must be built on hierarchy and authority and, moreover, assumed 
that the family was the ideal society in miniature. For in the family, "despite that each 
member has a different position and function, all work together for the welfare of the whole" 
(Zhang 1989: 92-93). Starting form this assumption, Confucians took up "society's 
familicization" (shehui jiatinghua & ^ %<- JL 4L· ) as their goal. Their most important 
accomplishment in this feat of social engineering was success in socializing those in 
subordinate social roles into willing submission, for which purpose instilling the virtue of 
filiality was central (Zhang 1989: 93-94). 
Apart from Zhang's actual handling of early Confucian texts, for our purposes, the 
most important feature of his interpretation lies in the argument he gives to justify the study 
of late Zhou materials in his effort to understand Chinese behavior today, like Hwang, who 
assumed that the message of these materials still resides in the Chinese collective 
unconsciousness, Zhang appeals to psychology to make his case. In chapter six, "Confucian 
Ethics and the Order Complex," he draws on the old Freudian ontogenic-phylogenic analogy 
(without using these terms). He explains Freud's theory that a childhood trauma can 
manifest itself as a "traumatic neurosis" that remains with an individual at a deep level of 
his/her personality. Then, he explains how this theory applies to China, as follows: 
The culture of a society is just like the personality of an individual. The 
Spring and Autumn, Warring States period was the stage of infancy for 
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Chinese thought, and the chaos of that period had a traumatic impact on the 
social structure. Due to this, the Chinese culture that was formed over the 
next 2,000 years or so harbored a type of "one's face changes at any mention 
of disorder" neurotic orientation (Zhang 1989: 158). 
This orientation, i.e., the Chinese "order complex," is thus manifested in Chinese behavior 
even today, regardless of any explicit loyalty to the Confucian tradition on the part of 
specific individuals. 
Reaching Zhang's final chapter, "Confucian Ethics and Modern China," one expects 
that he will explain economic development in terms of political stability, family solidarity, or 
other variables that seem logically linked to the order complex. However, the focus of this 
chapter is achievement motivation.10 Therein Zhang explains that achievement motivation 
has increasingly become the focus of efforts to explain the role of Confucianism in economic 
development. He surveys a variety of research reports on achievement motivation around 
the world, showing that they in fact do not establish that people living in East Asia's 
economically successful countries have a higher level of achievement motivation than people 
elsewhere. Nonetheless, Zhang holds onto the hope that future research, especially research 
concerning the relatively higher motivation of Chinese Americans over their fellow citizens, 
will help to verify the role of achievement motivation in Chinese economic successes. 
In the conclusion to chapter eight, entitled "Confucianism Awaits the Call of History," 
Zhang finally makes an effort to link achievement motivation to some elements of the 
previous chapters' discussion of the Chinese order complex (Zhang 1989:260-263). He says 
it is linked, for example, to the discussion in chapter three of the Confucian stress on 
personal cultivation and of Confucian family ideals (as motivation to succeed can be 
enhanced by the need to glorify one's ancestors). It is also said to be linked to elements of 
China's shame culture, as discussed in chapter six, since fear of shame leads one to exert 
effort. Of course, these are all "Confucian" values that have appeared in other works with 
which we have dealt, leaving us wondering (as in the case of Hwang Kwang-kuo's social 
scientific hermeneutics): was Zhang's "sociological interpretation of Chinese thought" worth 
the effort? 
The Confucian Tradition and the Myth of Confucian China 
Despite the questionable results of their efforts, Hwang and Zhang should be praised 
for at least trying to ground the "Confucian" values they discuss in materials that have an 
undisputed place in the Confucian tradition. Among others we have covered, the economist 
A possible explanation for this incongruity lies in the fact that a large section 
of the last chapter was previously published separately in the proceedings of the third 
Seminar on Chinese Culture and Modernization (Hong Kong, June 1988). See Zhang 1991. 
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Hou Chia-chu merits similar praise for his work with pre-Qin Confucian materials. And 
both Chen Qinan and Huang Chin-hsing must be acknowledged for using an historical 
approach which, in our opinion, is even more praiseworthy. Both stress the continued 
impact today of late imperial Confucianism (the elite tradition for Huang, and the popular 
"Confucian" family system for Chen), which make sit unnecessary for them to postulate the 
existence of vestiges of late Zhou Confucianism at deep levels of the Chinese psyche. 
When we say these scholars deserve praise, we also wish to draw attention to the need for 
further study of the mechanisms by which values embodied in historical Confucian texts and 
lives become diffused throughout Chinese society, even if we have good prima fade reasons 
for assuming that they did undergo such diffusion. 
Other scholars have been more content to accept something on the order of Berger's 
'Vulgar Confucianism," allowing that values commonly sensed to be elements of traditional 
Chinese culture can be called "Confucian." Among them some feel more strongly than 
others the need to seek empirical evidence that these values actually are still operative 
today. Yang Kuo-shu and Cheng Po-shyun are the best examples of this within the scope 
of this article. Of course, Berger has also felt this need, as witnessed by his founding the 
Institute for the Study of Economic Culture. Moreover, he has become quite self-critical 
about using the term "Confucianism" due to an "aha experience" that he had after meeting 
with anthropologist Li Yih-yuan (Academia Sinica) in Taiwan and, later, visiting a spirit 
temple in Singapore. What he now calls the "Li hypothesis" stipulates that values associated 
with the post-Confucian hypothesis may in fact be rooted in folk traditions rather than in any 
"great tradition," Confucian or Buddhist (Berger 1988: 9). 
It seems unlikely, however, that the majority of Chinese scholars working in this area 
will have a similar conversion experience. The works surveyed in this section of our essay 
conclusively demonstrate that the myth of Confucian China is alive and well today, at least 
among many social scientists in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The label "Confucian" is apt to be 
applied to a whole range of cultural values primarily on the basis that they have a certain 
Chineseness. As we have seen, these include discipline and frugality, pragmatism,harmony, 
respect for one's work, reverence for one's family, acceptance of hierarchical social 
structures, devotion to education, stress on shame and "face," concern for guanti and renqing, 
personal/familial achievement, and so forth. Although this is not an entirely new trend, there 
is something new about it. The values in question are being linked with the Confucian 
tradition by social scientists seeking to describe its contribution to modernization, not by 
modernist critics of traditional Chinese thought and behavior. What does this mean for 
Confucianism as an evolving moral-spiritual tradition in the modern world? Who speaks for 
this tradition? Do they wish to join the chorus in praising Confucianism for its role in 
economic development? to what degree do they allow a place in their tradition for the 
values of ,Vulgar Confucianism"? These are among the questions on which we must reflect 
in section three of this article. 
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3 
Effects on Today's Evolving Confucian Tradition 
The intent of this essay is simply to describe rather than to develop views of 
Confucianism. Nonetheless, at this point, we must commit ourselves to some definition of 
that tradition which, according to our argument, is being affected by social scientific 
discussions of Confucianism and economic development. We stipulate, first of all, that like 
any moral-spiritual tradition, the Confucian one is dynamic, always changing. Unlike many 
representatives of the tradition, we view it as having no unchanging essence. It certainly 
honors specific historical texts and lives, but their meaning is found in the written, oral, and 
behaviorial expressions of each new generation of those who interpret the tradition. Thus, 
we stipulate, secondly, that the key decision to make is defining the tradition at any given 
time and place (e.g., contemporary Taiwan) is this: Who are its interpreters, or "carriers" 
(in the Weberian sense)? And, just as we expunge from our definition any notion of 
unchanging essence in a tradition, we also avoid identifying its "authentic" or "orthodox" 
carriers, leaving this task to those within the tradition. Anyone doing the work of 
interpretation qualifies as a carrier. The carriers (socially and individually) and their 
interpretations (in theory and practice) constitute the tradition. 
While this seems simple enough as a general principle, applying it to specific cases 
is a complex task. Weber's work related to this issue is not much help for two related 
reasons:. first,he assumed that one could identify a social stratum that would be "at least 
predominantly decisive" for a tradition; second, in the case of Confucianism, he said this 
stratum was traditional China's literati (Weber 1946: 268). Tautologically, yet for the most 
part correctly, the carriers of the rujia (literati tradition) were the ru (literati). Today, the 
ru as such no longer exist, and no other group has emerged as the "predominantly decisive" 
carriers of rujia (which, if translated into English as "literati tradition" and applied to 
contemporary developments, would be an anachronism). 
Taking the case of contemporary Taiwan, for example, we see many competing 
interpretations of the Confucian tradition. There are interpretations from thinkers of the 
contemporary Neo-Confucian movement and other philosophers, from various governmental 
organizations, such as the Ministry of Education and the Committee for Chinese Cultural 
Resurgence (zhongguo wenhua fuxing weiyuan hui), from leaders of syncretic religions, such 
as the Way of Unity (yiguandao), and from the social scientists we have covered here. In 
what follows, we will not be able to consider the mutual influences between these four and 
all other groups of modern interpreters of Confucianism. We will limit ourselves to two 
groups of Chinese intellectuals, considering the possible influence of social scientific 
interpreters of Confucianism, among other relevant factors, on the first group of interpreters 
just mentioned, whom we will call "Chinese humanists." 
Aside from the practical consideration (e.g., explicit interpretations of Confucianism 
by Chinese humanists are easier to identify and study than those of government officials or 
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leaders of syncretic religions), the strongest justification for emphasizing this group is their 
self-professed interest in the Confucian tradition. This means we endorse, to a degree, Wm. 
Theodore deBary's definition of "Confucianists," when he states: "For our purposes 
[identifying common elements in the works of relevant Chinese and Japanese thinkers of the 
llth-19th centuries] it is enough to identify as Confucianists those who accept the authority 
of the Confucian classics as providing the most reliable guide to the conduct of life and 
government " (deBary 1959). We endorse this definition because it advises us to pay special 
attention to those who have some self-conscious commitment to the Confucian tradition. 
Yet, despite deBary's own intent to distinguish his approach from that of scholars who view 
Confucianism primarily in its role as a tool of government, we would want to interpret this 
definition broadly enough to include those whose "acceptance" of the tradition is not as pure 
as deBary might stipulate. In other words, we embrace the principle that one should begin 
with those, such as modern Chinese humanists, who have a commitment to the tradition that 
is relatively free of ulterior motives or interest in other traditions, yet we believe one should 
ultimately include those linked to the tradition in ways that are perhaps less direct or self-
conscious (social scientists, government officials, leaders of syncretic religions, etc.). 
The Situation of Chinese Intellectuals 
Because of our decision to focus on Chinese intellectuals, we wish to make two 
comments about their situation in recent history. The first is that, especially prior to the 
1980s, whether or not a certain intellectual praised or criticized the Confucian tradition was 
often decided by the line between the two groups mentioned above: social scientists and 
Chinese humanists. In fact, those we will use below to represent the latter group can, with 
few exceptions, be called "Confucian" humanists, although those in the former group cannot 
simply be termed "anti-Confucian" without misinterpreting the complexities of the situation. 
A fine attempt to explain these complexities is found in Thomas Metzger, Escape from 
Predicament, in which the situation is described in terms that are very well suited for our 
purposes, with a focus on Taiwan just prior to the time when many social scientists began 
to evaluate Confucianism positively. According to Metzger: 
The scientistic May Fourth rejection of the Confucian order...is still very much 
alive, whether in Mao's Marxism or in the careful research of behavioral 
scientists like Yang Kuo-shu and Li I-yuan.... Although acutely aware of the 
need to avoid identifying "modern" personality patterns with peculiarly 
Western ones, they are forced by the very nature of their disciplinary literature 
to evaluate China's traditional patterns according to the norms of "modern" 
behavior formulated by American behavioral scientists like Alex Inkeles, and 
they often use terms like "authoritarian" and "particularistic" to type traditional 
behavior traits as pathological or at least undesirable today....[making] difficult 
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any humanistic attempt to turn back to their tradition as a source of moral 
values needed in contemporary life (Metzger 1977: 6-7). 
Regarding Chinese humanists, he then adds: 
Such an attempt, however, has been and is still being made by prominent 
Chinese intellectuals. Yet their work has also involved a radical departure 
from tradition. Generally speaking they have rejected institutional 
Confucianism and Confucian fundamentalism.... [T]he modern adherents of 
Confucian philosophy have given, perhaps, an unprecedented emphasis to this 
[false/true Confucianism] distinction, sifting through the impure ore of their 
past to extract a 'spirit' of morality which could serve for the future (Metzger 
1977: 7). 
The background of most of the scholars treated in section two of this essay, including 
Yang Kuo-shu, whom Metzger mentions by name, puts them clearly in the group he 
identifies as Westernized behavioral scientists. For purposes of this essay, it is important to 
note that the basic intellectual orientation of this group has been quite different from that 
of the Chinese humanists who have consistently supported the Confucian tradition. 
Our second comment concerns a widespread, perhaps global, shift in the overall 
thought-world in which modern Chinese intellectuals exist. In our view, this is related to a 
more specifically Chinese shift away from what Romeyn Taylor calls "cosmic 
encompassment": the assumption in imperial China that the cosmos constituted the largest 
and most significant realm of value, within which the state and society (or the integrated 
state-society, as he sees it) exist as a subordinate realm of value that must maintain itself in 
accord with cosmic structures and forces (Taylor 1989). In our view, now that the most 
significant realm of value for almost all national leaders is the economic realm, we can say 
that ours is the age of "economic encompassment," in which the important forces are 
perceived to be market forces, not cosmic forces. The irresistible attraction of material 
betterment has made the development of industrial capitalism and related technologies the 
summum bonum for all nations willing and able to pay the price. Today we see a macabre 
reversal of premodern societies, in which the scope of economic activity was normally 
restricted by moral norms and customary taboos expressing the suspicion that profit seeking 
might undermine both personal morality and social harmony. Modern societies increasingly 
subordinate non-economic values to economic goals: higher GNP's, better industrial 
infrastructure, more adequate financial planning, etc. The main national goal, whether in 
Chinese societies or elsewhere, is no longer to be in harmony with the cosmos; it is to 
respond deftly to the ebb and flow of market forces. 
Within this context, it is not surprising to find that new positive evaluations of the 
Confucian tradition stress its alleged role in economic development, especially when we 
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consider the source of these evaluations: social scientists who constitute the most 
"modernized" type of Chinese intellectuals. Therefore, although there has been a shift in 
their evaluation of Confucianism, we would be wrong to say they have abandoned those 
evaluative assumptions which, as Metzger says, they are forced to hold by the very nature 
of their disciplines. Indeed, it is precisely those assumptions-part and parcel of our age of 
economic encompassment—that leads them to define and evaluate Confucianism in a way 
that links it to economic development. Whether this is only a first step in a deeper re-
evaluation of the Confucian tradition, considering its intrinsic (moral-spiritual) as well as 
extrinsic (utilitarian) value, remains to be seen. 
The Reconfiguration of Confucian Values and the Response of Chinese Humanists 
Having adopted a view of the Confucian traditional a dynamic entity, and having 
described our time as the age of economic encompassment, we can now ask: What changes 
is the Confucian tradition going through in connection with the debate over Confucianism 
and economic development? What is signified by the tendency to accept more utilitarian 
criteria in evaluating Confucianism, giving a central place in the tradition's value structure 
to the "Confucian work ethic" and to commercial enterprise? And what has been the 
response of Chinese humanists, who over the years have claimed to appreciate the 
Confucian tradition for its intrinsic value, to re-evaluations of Confucianism by social 
scientists using utilitarian criteria? 
First of all, it would be wrong to see the Confucian reappraisal of labor and 
commerce (as opposed to the ideal lifestyle of scholar-officials) as something new. Yü 
Ying-shih (Yu Yingshi), for example, has offered much evidence of the Song apd Ming roots 
of this reappraisal in his stimulating response to Weber's analysis of Confucianism in 
Zhongguo jinshi zongjiao lunliyu shangren jingshen (Religious ethics and the merchant ethos 
in early modern China). This reappraisal, in Yü's view, involved not only more open 
Confucian attitudes toward merchants and commercial enterprise but also the development, 
during the Ming and Qing periods, of a Way of Merchants (gudao) that featured a 
Confucian-style "innerworldly asceticism" (Yu 1987: 147-161). Presumably, what we have, 
then, is a long-term gradual process of change that is best conceptualized as a reconfiguration 
ofvaL·es. That is to say, we should understand that the seemingly new values that are central 
in a tradition today were probably once peripheral to the tradition but, nonetheless, part of 
it. It is rare, though possible, that entirely new values from outside a tradition will come to 
hold a central position within a new configuration. It is much more likely that old roots for 
"new" values can be found within a tradition, thanks especially to the breadth and ambiguity 
of the ancient sources of most traditions, including Confucianism. Thus, the importance of 
the recent re-evaluations of the Confucian tradition by social scientists is not their utter 
newness but their character as somewhat surprising developments which in fact fit well 
within larger trends: the evolving Confucian reappraisal of commercial enterprise, the 
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increasingly utilitarian ethos of our age of economic encompassment, and, most recently, the 
growing empathy among Chinese intellectuals toward their traditional culture. 
What does this mean for Chinese humanists? although they are not the architects 
of the interpretation of Confucianism according to which it aids economic development, to 
the extent that they accept the role of custodians of the tradition, they will be concerned 
about the issue. And the issue is bound to be controversial for them. Thus, those Confucian 
humanists* who have joined the debate over this issue, have been quite divided over the 
merits of the case linking Confucianism and economic development. This can be seen by 
looking, for example, at their participation in the aforementioned 1989 Conference on 
Confucianism and Economic Development. 
At this conference, the first three papers were presented by well-known Chinese 
humanists invited by the conference organizers: Tu Wei-ming (Du Weiming >^ i #$l f^j ), 
Cheng Chung-ying (Cheng Zhongying ffi ^ ~fc ), and Charles Wei-hsun Fu (Fu Weixun 
A% $% itß ). Cheng and Tu, acknowledging the works of Berger and Kahn, for example, 
indicated a willingness to accept the post-Confucian hypothesis, with qualifications, including 
the idea of a place "post-Confucian" tradition for the values of "vulgar Confucianism" (Cheng 
1989: especially 39-43; Tu 1989: especially 70-75). Charles Fu, by contrast, indicated strong 
opposition to the thesis in question, taking issue with "the common assumption of a causal 
link between this phenomenon of increasing economic prosperity and the ideological 
structure of Confucianism" and saying of those who hold this assumption, "their views 
represent a serious oversimplification of the situation" (Fu 1989:105). In fact, Fu ended up 
taking a position like that taken by Winston Davis in his criticism of the "Japan theory," even 
referring to some of the same Japanese authors Davis had in mind. Fu concludes: "¿ι short, 
the value-neutral "is" and the value-laden "ought" are intermingled in their approaches" (Fu 
1989: 127-128). Speaking from his own normative position as a Chinese humanist, he 
outlines the features of a "multidimensional" approach to East Asian religions and, then, 
offers the following advice: 
With the above understanding of the multidimensional complexity of Chinese 
and Japanese religious cultures, we can then put Confucianism in a broader 
(pluralistic-oriented) ideological perspective and engage in a truly meaningful 
philosophical quest for the ideological revitalization of this particular tradition. 
This revitalization has a two-fold task: Firstly a total removal of any negative 
elements within the tradition that may become an ideological obstacle to the 
further economic development in East Asian societies; and secondly a creative 
self-transformation of the tradition in its various East Asian forms, in such a 
way that it will continue to provide the peoples of East Asian societies with 
abundant inspiration and ideas in seeking a higher moral and cultural standard 
for the qualitative improvement of individual and society (Fu 1989: 124). 
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This passage well exemplifies the moral and humanistic tone which, according to Metzger, 
typifies the modern Chinese humanists' style of discourse. 
Another example of this is found in an article in Zhishi fend by Harry Hsiao (Xiao 
Xinyi), another Chinese humanist residing overseas (Victoria University, Canada) who has 
been involved in the debate over Confucianism and economic development. In the title of 
his article he poses the question: "What can Confucian thought contribute to economic 
development" (rujia sbaang duiyujingjifazhan nenggou gongtian shenma)? His answer begins 
with precisely the kind of distinction between forms of Confucianism which Metzger said 
characterizes the humanistic approach Hsiao distinguishes three forms of Confucianism: 
"Junzi Confucianism" (junziru ~% \ \% ), "Imperial Confucianism"(ywyon<g7w 1§? f$ \$p 
) , and "Feudalistic Confucianism" (fengjianru fj $f_ '\% ). Junzi Confucianism is built 
around the traditional concept of ren mind yet finds itself in accord with modern concerns 
about pluralism, human rights, and "open society" ideals. Imperial Confucianism has been 
a mere prop for authoritarian rule right down to recent uses of Confucianism within the "two 
Jiangs" branch of the Nationalist Party. And Feudalistic Confucianism, which bears a striking 
resemblance to Confucianism as defined by many social scientists, designates the continuance 
of the consciousness and habits of conservatives within late imperial Confucianism. It 
includes elements of patrimonialism, familism, bureaucratism, and authoritarianism. 
Naturally, Hsiao's own judgment regarding theories on the relationship of Confucianism and 
economic development are offered from the perspective of Junzi Confucianism, as follows: 
The relationship between the two is definitely not a causal relationship. In 
other words, modern economic development is indeed not the product of 
Confucianism [ruxue i% ^ ]. The personal cultivation and "inner sagely, 
outer kingly" gongfu jß ^ with which Confucianism is most concerned 
cannot directly influence economic thinking.... Confucianism has the virtues 
of discipline and frugality, honor of education, and respect for one's work. 
These are beneficial factors for economic development, but the greatest 
contribution that Confucianism can possibly provide for economic 
development in the future is this: When a crossroad is reached on the road 
of economic development, and a decision about how to proceed must be 
made, possibly valuable reflections will be derived from the experience with 
value orientations in Confucianism (Xiao 1986: 2). 
The crossroads Hsiao has in mind are linked to issues of environmental pollution, quality of 
life, distribution of wealth, and the like. 
Other Chinese humanists who have responded to theories about Confucianism and 
economic development, while still adopting a humanistic approach and not aligning 
themselves with behavioral science, have been less direct and comprehensive in their 
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response than Charles Fu or Harry Hsiao. Yü Ying-shih, whose aforementioned book holds 
a central place in discussions of this issue, has criticized theories linking Confucianism with 
economic development today for primarily historiographical reasons, rather than due to any 
objections to the theorists' views of Confucianism. He advocates an approach linking 
Confucianism and economic activity which is grounded in research into the historical 
situation of Confucianism as well as into the behaviour, thought, and values of traditional 
Chinese merchants (Yu 1987:171-173). Nonetheless, Yü's book is generally regarded as an 
effort to defend Confucianism against its detractors, notably Weber, by uncovering its 
potential to aid economic development. As already indicated above, his book does so, above 
all, by telling the history of Confucianism's reappraisal of merchants and mercantile activity. 
An interesting case of the ongoing nature of this reappraisal is found in a recent 
article by Ts'ai Jen-hou (Cai Renhou), a key figure among Taiwan's contemporary Neo-
Confucians and Director of the Graduate Institute in Philosophy at Tunghai University. His 
article introduces "the contemporary Neo-Confucian view on rightness and profit (dangdai 
xinrujia di yiliguan). He describes this as a view in which "rightness and profit are both 
realized" (yili shuangcheng) in economic life, while distinguished at the level of moral 
principles. He argues that benefits for business and society as well as for Confucianism can 
follow from adopting this new view. On the one hand, if rightness serves as a guide in the 
pursuit of profit, business will benefit in the iong run and society will see more examples of 
successful merchants and industrialists contributing to social welfare. On the other hand, if 
we can find ways to seek profit that accord with rightness, the Confucian tradition will be 
taking a step toward solving its problem of putting moral ideals to use in the real world (Cai 
1991: 67-69). 
Ts'ai's treatment of the Confucian distinction between rightness and profit, while fully 
within the humanistic style of discourse and based on a better knowledge of Confucian texts 
and history than is possessed by the economists treating the issue who were covered earlier 
in this article, yet his final judgment is right in line with their interpretations. Indeed, he has 
no axe to grind with social scientists who present Confucianism as a source of cultural factors 
that are useful in economic development. He feels that heir willingness at least partly to 
abandon their anti-Confucian bias and offer positive evaluations of Confucianism follows 
naturally from the facts of East Asian economic success.11 
Our final case of response by a Chinese humanist comes from Zheng Zhiming 
(Chinese Literature, Tamkang University), a less distinguished and younger Neo-Confucian, 
who is known best for his work on Chinese religion in Taiwan. The main reason for 
discussing his response is because it is a long review article criticizing one of the books we 
featured above: Hwang Kwang-kuo's book on Confucian thought and East Asian economic 
development. Zheng's article, moreover, focuses on the issue of Hwang's implicit definition 
of Confucianism. Zheng does not challenge the thesis that renqing, utilitarian guanti, and 
Interview with Ts'ai Jen-hou at Tunghai University, June 15, 1992. 
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the like are cultural factors that can aid economic development, but he objects vehemently 
to the view that they can be derived from "Confucian thought itself1 without distorting its 
"original meaning" (21heng 1991: 440). The actual source of such cultural factors is not 
"Confucian thought" but "Confucian society" and "Confucian worship" (rujia chongbai), the 
latter term designating superficial reverence for elements of Confucianism (sages, texts, 
rituals) without understanding them (Zheng 1991: 444-45). As this indicates, Zheng's 
criticism of the social scientific approach to Confucianism and economic development is not 
as thoroughgoing as Harry Hsiao's criticism. Nonetheless, it is based on the same kind of 
distinction between more worthy and less worthy forms of Confucianism made by Hsiao, the 
sine qua non of the humanistic approach. 
Conclusion 
Like other social scientists who have offered new, positive evaluations of the 
Confucian tradition, in doing so Hwang Kwang-kuo has undergone a major intellectual shift. 
Some even think of his shift as a conversion.12 Yet Zheng's response to his book reveals 
the remaining gap between Hwang and Chinese humanists. In fact, differences between the 
two scholars encapsulate in a microcosm the larger division between Chinese humanists and 
social scientists as conceived above, with Metzger's input (defining "social scientists" 
somewhat narrowly as positivistic and/or behavioristic scholars). Humanists view the 
individual as a morally autonomous being seeking truth, while social scientists see the 
individual as a socially dependent being seeking security and gratification. Humanists see 
the Confucian tradition as the inherited wisdom of the past that the individual should use 
for personal cultivation and moral insight, while social scientists see the tradition as a source 
of social norms and behavior patterns. The humanists' interpretive approach stresses the 
intrinsic (moral-spiritual) value of the tradition, seeks the "original meaning" of texts, and 
entertains the idea that the texts express objective truth. The social scientists' interpretive 
approach, by contrast, stresses extrinsic (utilitarian) value, seeks the historical meaning of 
texts as this bears on the origin of social norms and behaviour patterns, and reduces the 
"truth" of texts' contents to their positive socio-economic functions. 
Neither of these perspectives was new in the 1980s, when Chinese social scientists 
began to create their positive evaluations of Confucianism. What was new was the flow of 
social scientific interpretations on a large scale into the existing stream of modern Confucian 
henneneutics, with its predominantly humanistic perspective. And, while the utilitarian 
criteria that entered the stream with these interpretations were also not new, their sudden 
this includes two sociologists whom I formally interviewed, Michael Hsin-huang 
Hsiao (Xiao Xinhuang ^ Jfj· /J£ , Academia Sinica, March 12,1992) and Cheng-shu Kao 
(Gao Chengshu ^ *fc <*£ , Tunghai University, June 9, 11992). 
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influx naturally induced a reaction from some Chinese humanists. Although their reaction 
followed upon very special circumstances, including East Asia's uniquely rapid economic 
development in recent decades, it can be compared with certain reactions of religious 
thinkers in the modern West. These are thinkers who lament what John Hick, for example, 
calls the displacement of "God" by "religion," which he explains as follows: 
This displacement of "God" by "religion" as the focus of a wide realm of 
discourse has brought with it a change in the character of the questions that 
are most persistently asked in this area. Concerning God, the traditional 
question has naturally been whether God exists or is real. This is not a 
question that arises with regard to religion. It is obvious that religion exists; 
the important queries concern the purposes that it serves in human life, 
whether it ought to be cultivated, and if so, in what directions it may most 
profitably be developed. Under the pressure of these concerns, the question 
of the truth of religious beliefs has fallen into the background and the issue 
of their practical usefulness has come forward instead to occupy the center of 
attention (Hick 1990: 91-92). 
The displacement of "God" by "religion" thus signifies the victory of the principle of utility 
("practical usefulness") in many modern Jews' and Christians' evaluations of their own 
traditions. The lesson thus learned can surely be applied to contemporary interpretations 
of Confucianism as covered in this article. Looking at the other side of the coin, the 
interpretations of Confucianism covered here teach us that the displacement of "cosmic 
encompassment" by "economic encompassment" signifies that we are looking at more than 
the victory of the principle of utility among intellectuals in late twentieth century East Asia. 
We are looking at the adoption, perhaps globally, of a new set of assumptions about the 
"world" which call us away from concerns with cosmic forces and structures, and toward 
concerns with economic forces and structures (the World Bank, the European free Market, 
the North American Co-prosperity Sphere, GATT, etc.) And perhaps not even a hole in 
the sky can call us back. 
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